Future robots should have common sense about the world in order to handle the problems they will encounter. A large part of this commonsense knowledge must be naive physics knowledge, since carrying out even the simplest everyday chores requires familiarity with physics laws. But how should one start codifying this knowledge? What kind of skills should be elicited from the experts (each and every one of us)? This paper will attempt to provide some hints by studying the mental models of (...) force and motion. (shrink)

The Encyclopedia of Philosophy could state accurately in 1967: "Of all the major German philosophers, Schelling is the least known in the English-speaking world." A tentative survey discloses few articles and books on one who is casually ranked with Hegel. There is, in fact, not one book-length study in English on Schelling’s thought.

By 1800 Schelling’s thought had moved from the Fichtean Ich through all-encompassing systems of objective nature to the point where the idea for a first synthesis, a first system, captured his attention. And so at twenty-five, at Jena, he composed the first of those systems written and published each year between 1800 and 1802.

As is well known among readers of Tradition and Discovery, William H. Poteat was a central influence in bringing Michael Polanyi to the attention of American scholars and, particularly, to the interest of scholarship in religion and theology. Poteat’s own work was heavily impacted by Polanyi. In turn, Polanyi’s affiliationwith Poteat at Duke and elsewhere clearly impressed and edified Polanyi and led to Polanyi’s request for Poteat’s collaboration with him on Meaning and to the prospect of Polanyi’s coming to Duke (...) for six weeks to facilitate this. Unfortunately, that promising time was not realized. This present essay represents an effortto discern a direction in which such a collaboration might have deeply and felicitously influenced Polanyi’s interpretation and celebration of his own poignant, yet quite restless, religious sensibilities. (shrink)

As is well known among readers of Tradition and Discovery, William H. Poteat was a central influence in bringing Michael Polanyi to the attention of American scholars and, particularly, to the interest of scholarship in religion and theology. Poteat’s own work was heavily impacted by Polanyi. In turn, Polanyi’s affiliationwith Poteat at Duke and elsewhere clearly impressed and edified Polanyi and led to Polanyi’s request for Poteat’s collaboration with him on Meaning and to the prospect of Polanyi’s coming to Duke (...) for six weeks to facilitate this. Unfortunately, that promising time was not realized. This present essay represents an effortto discern a direction in which such a collaboration might have deeply and felicitously influenced Polanyi’s interpretation and celebration of his own poignant, yet quite restless, religious sensibilities. (shrink)

The project, entertained by Leibniz and others, of creating an ideal language to facilitate ratiocination, is investigated in detail. Six possible relations between the ideal language (IL) and the natural language (NL) it replaces are studied. (1) IL says exactly what NL says, but says it much more clearly. (2) IL says exactly what NL says, but does so more economically. (3) IL says exactly what NL says, but does so more succinctly. (4) IL says part of what NL says, (...) and says it more perspicuously. (5) IL says part of what NL says, and says it more perspicuously; moreover, there is an effective procedure for going from NL to IL. (6) IL says everything that NL says, plus some things that NL cannot say. (shrink)

Reanimated for the contemporary literature in the writings of Quine, [16]) and Kuhn [7], the conventionalism of Duhem [2] and Poincaré [12] has emerged in the last few years as one of the genuinely interesting topics in the philosophy of science. The theory in question—let us follow Grünbaum [3] in calling it the D-thesis, after its founder, Pierre Duhem—claims three things: a single scientific hypothesis H is never disconfirmable in isolation from its fellow; every single hypothesis H of science presupposes, (...) explicitly or implicitly, the support of a conjunction A = A, • A2 • … • Am of auxiliary assumptions or hypotheses; the failure of an observational consequence of H in face of contradictory evidence disconfirms only the conjunction of H and A, not H alone—i.e. establishes only ∼. The logical picture is as follows. (shrink)

Peut-être que jusqu'ici dans les recherches philosophiques sur la nature du temps on a attribué trop peu d'attention à la distinction entre « temps » comme catégorie mathématique d'une part, et « temps » comme il est réalisé dans des processus et des périodes d'autre part. Quand on essaie de combler ce vide, on éprouve le besoin d'impliquer dans ses considérations l'apparition fréquente de « nouveauté » et de « commencement ». C'est pourquoi on examine dans la première partie de (...) cet article comment nous nous formons une notion mathématique du temps. Il apparaît que cela se fait en idéalisant la perception des périodes. On s'imagine que l'unité du temps une fois choisie peut être reproduite exactement, et même jusqu'à l'inñni. En outre on s'imagine que chaque période peut être divisée en des intervalles arbitrairement petits. Un instant est pensé comme une limite nette entre le temps qui précède et le temps qui suit ; ici la séparation entre les deux parties du temps est posée comme absolue contre arrière-plan d'un temps dont justement la cohérence est posée comme absolue. C'est ainsi que naît la catégorie du temps comme une possibilité homogène, toujours égale à elle-même pour indiquer des instants indivisibles et pour délimiter des périodes, à savoir une possibilité qui s'étend sans limites des deux côtés de l'instant actuel, aussi bien vers l'avenir que vers le passé. Quand on indique un instant, deux notions contradictoires sont posées en même temps, à savoir une séparation absolue et une cohérence absolue. Dans la physique ce schéma mathématique s'avère extrêmement utile. Pourtant il s'agit de se rendre toujours compte de l'applicabilité défectueuse de ce schéma, de sorte qu'on fasse attention aux complications qui exigent un complément et une correction de la théorie. Quand on applique le même schéma aussi aux processus vitaux et aux événements psychiques, alors l'incohérence entre le schéma mathématique et la succession réelle des périodes se trouve encore plus grande. Dans la deuxième partie on analyse le « commencement ». De la manière la plus originelle un commencement se présente devant nous, quand nous essayons d'avoir une vue d'ensemble de notre propre vie, comme elle se trouve dans notre mémoire. Dans le passé nous rencontrons alors une frontière que nous ne pouvons pas marquer cependant nettement sur une échelle mathématique. Ainsi en analysant chaque commencement on doit distinguer de nouveau soigneusement le commencement dans le domaine mathématique de celui dans l'ordre réel. Le caractère abrupt qui est propre à un commencement « mathématique » se trouve absent dans un commencement « réel ». Dans la troisième partie il est démontré que le temps et le commencement sont inséparablement liés l'un à l'autre. Le temps réel apparaît partout dans des périodes ayant un commencement et ainsi dans un ensemble compliqué de commencement et de permanence. Toutes les totalités dans la nature vivante et dans la nature inanimée, les individus ainsi que les espèces, ont été neuves une fois. Avant ce commencement multiple notre univers a été neuf. Cependant, alors il appert que cette mesure perd son utilité. Lorsque l'univers était encore en gestation, notre temps, lui aussi, avec sa mesure était en formation. C'est pourquoi une localisation exacte du commencement de l'univers sur l'échelle du temps n'est pas seulement impossible, mais même absurde. Cependant, si un commencement ne peut jamais être déñni de façon mathématique, il est pourtant défini de sa manière particulière dans le temps, c'est à dire par une définition qui essentiellement contient une certaine imprécision. Quant au commencement de l'univers les sciences physiques conduisent par des chemins différents à un même résultat, et font conclure à un âge de l'univers de quatre milliards et demi d'années environ. Finalement une question concernant la notion de création se présente. La tradition connaît en effet une notion de création dans un sens très stricte, distinguée des notions de « conservatio » et de « concursus ». On a l'habitude de lier le fait de la création à un seul ou à quelques instants. Mais nous croyons pouvoir démontrer que dans la dépendance que les créatures ont a l'égard du Créateur, il y a toujours aussi un aspect d' « être créé » dans le sens cité plus haut, un aspect qui se met d'autant plus au premier rang qu'il y a plus de nouveauté et de discontinuité vis à vis du passé. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: In Search of History: Historiography in the Ancient World and the Origins of Biblical History. By John Van Seters. The Hidden God: The Hiding of the Face of God in the Old Testament. By Samuel E. Balentine. Theodicy in the Old Testament. Edited by James L. Crenshaw. Ce Dieu censé aimer la Souffrance. By François Varone. Evil and Evolution, A Theodicy. By Richard W. Kropf. ‘Poet and Peasant’ and ‘Through Peasant Eyes’: A Literary‐Cultural Approach to (...) the Parable in Luke. By Kenneth Bailey. The Biblical Foundations for Mission. By Donald Senior and Carroll Stuhlmueller. New Testament Foundations of Ministry. By Colin Kruse. Church, Ministry and Unity. By James E. Griffiss. Theology of Ministry. By Thomas Franklin O'Meara. Yesterday and Today: A Study of Continuities in Christology. By Colin E. Gunton. I believe in the Holy Spirit. By Yves Congar. Between Jesus and Paul. By Martin Hengel. From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and its Background. By Frances Young. Alan of Lille: The Frontiers of Theology in the Later Twelfth Century. By G.R. Evans. Mystic and Pilgrim: The Book and the World of Margery Kempe. By Clarissa W. Atkinson. Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408–1929. Edited by N. Macdougall. Renaissance and Reform: The Italian Contribution. Collected Essays, Volume II. By Frances A. Yates. Seven‐Headed Luther: Essays in Commemoration of a Quincentury, 1483–1983. Edited by Peter Newman Brooks. Ökumenische Erschliessung Martin Luthers. Edited by Peter Manns and Harding Meyer. Luther's Ecumenical Significance, An Interconfessional Consultation. Edited by Peter Manns and Harding Meyer, in collaboration with Carter Lindberg and Harry McSorley. States of Mind: A Study of Anglo‐Irish Conflict 1780 to 1980. By Oliver MacDonagh. The Parish Clergy in Nineteenth‐Century Russia: Crisis, Reform, Counter Reform. By Gregory L. Freeze. Pusey Rediscovered. Edited by Perry Butler. Between Two Worlds: George Tyrrell's Relationship to the Thought of Matthew Arnold. By Nicholas Sagovsky. The Concept of Glaubenslehre. By Walter E. Wyman, Jr. The Existence and Nature of God. Edited by Alfred J. Freddoso. Faith and Reason. By Anthony Kenny. Logic and The Nature of God. By Stephen T. Davis. Personal Responsibility and Christian Morality. By Josef Fuchs. Morality and Conflict. By Stuart Hampshire. Realism and Imagination in Ethics. By Sabina Lovibond. Intentionality. By John R. Searle. Philosophical Papers, I: Practical Reason. By G.H. von Wright. Philosophical Papers, II: Philosophical Logic. By G.H. von Wright. A Model of Making: Literary Criticism and its Theology. By Ruth Etchells. The Return of the Goddess: Femininity, Aggression and the Modern Grail Quest. By Edward Whitmont. The Power of the Poor in History. By Gustavo Gutierrez, translated by Robert R. Barr. The God of the Xhosa. By Janet Hodgson. Our Hymn Tunes: Their Choice and Performance. By Donald Webster. The Almighty Wall: The Architecture of Henry Vaughan. By William Morgan. An Introduction to Plato's Laws. By R.E. Stalley. Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved. By Kenneth M. Sayre. Plato's ‘Parmenides’: Translation and Analysis. By R.E. Allen. Politics in the Ancient World. By M.I. Finley. (shrink)

"Contemporary Mind - Some Modern Answers" is a fantastic collection of essays by English science writer John W. Sullivan. They deal with a range of subjects, ranging from mysticism and immortality to the relationship between science and art. John William Navin Sullivan (1886 - 1937) was a literary journalist and popular science writer most famous for his study of Beethoven. He is also responsible for having written some of the earliest non-technical accounts of Einstein's General Theory of Relativity, and he (...) was acquainted with many important writers in London in the 1920s, including John Middleton Murry, Aldous Huxley, Wyndham Lewis, Aleister Crowley and T. S. Eliot. Other notable works by this author include "Aspects of Science" (1923), "Aspects of Science: Second Series" (1926), and An Outline of Modern Knowledge (1931). Contents include: "The Balanced Life," "The Problem of Suffering," "The Necessity of Mysticism," "Human Immortality," "A Dissertation on Beethoven," "The Scientific Outlook," "A Dissertation on Maxwell," "New Principles," "A Dissertation on Newton," "Science and Art," "Mathematics and Culture," "Sir Josiah Stamp," "Mr. Aldous Huxley," etc. Many vintage books such as this are increasingly scarce and expensive. It is with this in mind that we are republishing this volume now in an affordable, modern, high-quality edition complete with the original text and artwork. (shrink)

The Bible has influenced contemporary culture both positively and negatively. The present volume is a collection of papers that were discussed at an international colloquium on the use of the Bible in Ethics in the Department of Biblical Studies at the University of Sheffield in April 1995. Participants came from many parts of the world and from different backgrounds, and the papers reflect their varied interests and the contexts in which they work. The contributors, in addition to the three editors, (...) are John Barton, Bruce Birch, Mark Brett, Mark Chapman, David Clines, Philip Davies, Cheryl Exum, Stephen Fowl, Norman Gottwald, John Haldane, Walter Houston, Sharon Ringe, Chrisopher Rowland, Lisa Sowle Cahill and Gerald West. (shrink)

The purpose of this brief introduction is to describe the origin of the papers here presented and to acknowledge the help of some of the many individuals who were involved in the preparation of this volume. Of the eighteen papers, nine stem from the annual fall colloquium of the Depart ment of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario held in London, Ontario from November 10 to November 12, 1967. The colloquium was entitled 'Philosophical Logic'. After some discussion, the editors (...) decided to retain that title for this volume. Von Wright's paper 'On the Logic and Ontology of Norms' is printed here after some revision. A. R. Anderson commented on the paper at the colloquium, but his comments here are based upon the revised version of the von Wright paper. The chairman of the session at which von Wright's paper was read and discussed was T. A. Goudge. Aqvist's paper 'Scattered Topics in Interrogative Logic', and Belnap's comments, 'Aqvist's Cor rections-Accumulating Question-Sequences', are printed as delivered. The chairman of the Aqvist-Belnap session was R. E. Butts. Wilfrid Sellars' paper 'Some Problems about Belief' is printed as delivered at the col loquium, but 'Quantifiers, Beliefs, and Sellars' by Ernest Sosa is a revision of his comments at the colloquium. That session was chaired by G. D. W. Berry. Ackermann's paper 'Some Problems oflnductive Logic', as well as Skyrms' comments, are printed as delivered. (shrink)